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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review are whether, when the law
is properly applied, there are genuine issues of fact regarding:
1.

Estoppel of respondents from asserting the statute of

frauds because of Vaughn Rasmussen's detrimental reliance on
their representations;
2.

Whether there are sufficient memoranda of the agree-

ments of the parties;

3.

Whether Vaughn Rasmussen's partial performance

entitles him to present his claim for equitable relief; and
4.

Whether the defense of fraud, as asserted by Vaughn

Rasmussen against the counterclaim, was barred by the statute
of limitations.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
There are no authorities directly dispositive of the issues
presented.

The applicable statutes of fraud are Utah Code Ann.

§§ 25-5-1 and 3.

The applicable statute of limitations is Utah

Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3).

Additional authorities which bear on

the issues are quoted or appropriately referenced in the argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Vaughn Rasmussen claims breach of an agreement by respondents Deseret Federal and Crossroads to lease to him space on
Level One of the Crossroads Mall.

Respondent Crossroads

counterclaims for rent claimed to be due and owing on Vaughn
Rasmussen's Level Two space in the Mall.
Appeal No. 20512 is an appeal from final orders of the
District Court granting summary judgment in favor of both
respondents.

Appeal No. 20755 is an appeal from a final order

of the District Court granting summary judgment in favor of
respondent Crossroads on its counterclaim against ctppellant.
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
On December 10, 1984 District Judge Sawaya entered summary
judgment in favor of Deseret Federal based on the statute of
frauds.

Notice of intention to appeal that ruling was filed

December 11, 1984.
On January 22, 1985 District Judge Sawaya entered summary
judgment in favor of Crossroads based on the statute of
frauds.

Notice of appeal was filed regarding that judgment on

February 20, 1985
On May 20, 1985 the lower court entered summary judgment in
favor of Crossroads on its counterclaim after hearing oral
argument which focused on whether Vaughn Rasmussen*s asserted
defense of fraud would lie. Notice of appeal of that judgment
was filed June 19, 1985.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Beginning in 1980 Vaughn Rasmussen operated a shoe store on
Level Two of the Crossroads Mall.

R. 154-55.

operated a bank on Level One of the Mall.

Deseret Federal

R. 155.

Both par-

ties were tenants of respondent Crossroads who owned the Mall.
Crossroads conducted its leasing operations in the Mall through
its leasing agent, Kravco, Inc.
Level Two Lease.

In May of 1980 Vaughn Rasmussen entered

into a lease agreement with Crossroads for lease of space on
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Level Two of the Mall.

R. 182-225.

That agreement is a

43-page form lease provided by the lessor containing all the
terms of leasing in the mall such as use and modification of
the space and use of common areas.

Id.

Prior to the execution

of this lease Vaughn Rasmussen was told by agents of Crossroads
that the Level Two space was a prime location because Crossroads would be constructing an elevated walkway between Crossroads Mall and the ZCMI Mall which would open up into Crossroads Mall right in front of Vaughn Rasmussen*s space.

R.

239-40.
This representation was made to induce Vaughn Rasmussen to
lease the Level Two space.

R, 240.

It was a material repre-

sentation which Vaughn Rasmussen relied on in signing the Level
Two lease.

R. 240. Vaughn Rasmussen subsequently learned that

Crossroads never intended to construct a walkway entering on
Level Two and that the planned walkway was to enter on Level
Three.

R. 240-41.

In response to respondent Crossroad's

counterclaim for rent on the Level Two space, Vaughn Rasmussen
asserted fraud in the inducement as an affirmative defense.

R.

239.
Level One Lease.

Vaughn Rasmussen nevertheless attempted

to make his business successful in the Mall.

Still anxious to

obtain the traffic flow he thought would be passing the Level
Two space, Vaughn Rasmussen approached Deseret Federal and
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Crossroads about expanding his store downward into Level One.
R. 175, pp. 20-21.

The approval of both respondents was neces-

sary because Deseret Federal was occupying the space wanted by
Vaughn Rasmussen.

Deseret Federal had to agree to surrender a

portion of its leased space to Crossroads so Crossroads could
lease the space to Vaughn Rasmussen.
In July of 1982 Vaughn Rasmussen received Deseret Federal's
promise to surrender the Level One space on certain terms.
155.

R.

In August of 1982 Vaughn Rasmussen reached an agreement

with Crossroads that Crossroads would lease the Level One space
to for $20 per square foot, for the duration of Vaughn
Rasmussen's lease on the Level Two space and on the same terms
as were found in the 43-page Level Two lease.

R. 155-156.

As

additional consideration Vaughn Rasmussen also promised to pay
previously disputed construction costs relating to the Level
Two space.

R. 156.

Crossroads also promised in August of 1982 to provide
Vaughn Rasmussen with a written lease for the Level One space.
R. 157.
Based on the agreements and the representations they
include, Vaughn Rasmussen proceeded to perform the deal and
make necessary arrangements to occupy the space.

Between

August of 1982 and January of 1983 he paid Crossroads over
$2,400 in disputed construction costs.
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R. 157. This was done

in reliance on Crossroads' repeated assurances to Vaughn
Rasmussen that a written lease was forthcoming.

R. 158.

In January of 1983 Vaughn Rasmussen advised Crossroads'
leasing agent, Bruce Barcal, that he needed to take bids on the
construction work that was planned and also needed to provide
funds for remodeling at Deseret Federal's location on 3900
South.

(This remodeling was one of the considerations Deseret

Federal received for its promise to surrender the Level One
space.)

R. 175, pp. 40-42.

Mr. Barcal was also advised at

that time that Vaughn Rasmussen had applied for a Small Business Administration loan in the amount of $250,000 which was
contingent on Vaughn Rasmussen occupying the Level One space
and that he wanted the written lease before committing to the
loan.

Mr. Barcal assured him it was safe to proceed with the

loan and that Vaughn need not worry about the lease because it
would arrive shortly.

J[d. Based on Mr. Barcal's representa-

tion that the parties had agreement and that a written lease
would be provided shortly, Vaughn Rasmussen obligated himself
on this loan in January of 1983.

R. 157.

The documents exchanged between the parties provide further
evidence that the agreements existed and that the representations were made.

As to Deseret Federal the terms of its agree-

ment to relinquish the space are fully delineated in a letter
dated January 13, 1983, written to Bruce Barcal by Deseret
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Federal's vice president Howard Swapp.

R. 175, Exhibit 2. The

letter advises Mr. Barcal that Deseret Federal will vacate
approximately 950 square feet on Level One only if (1) the
space is released to Vaughn Rasmussen, (2) Deseret Federal is
released from responsibility for the space and (3) Deseret
Federal and Vaughn Rasmussen execute additional agreements.
Id.

The additional agreement referred to in the letter was

drafted by Deseret Federal and delivered to Vaughn Rasmussen on
March 9, 1983.

R. 175, Exhibit 14. This 5-page agreement pro-

vides for Vaughn Rasmussen to arrange and pay for the remodeling and relocation associated with the change.

Mr. Swapp's

letter also authorizes Mr. Barcal's office to act as Deseret
Federal's agent to close the transaction.

This authority

lasted only until March 15, 1983 according to the letter.
After January 13, 1983, when Bruce Barcal had the authority
of Deseret Federal and Crossroads, Vaughn Rasmussen asked him
where the written lease was.

Barcal told him again and again

that it would be produced any day.

Specifically, Barcal told

Vaughn Rasmussen the leases were coming by way of Federal
Express to Vaughn Rasmussen's home on two separate occasions in
February of 1983.

R. 175, p. 45.

On one of those occasions

Vaughn Rasmussen stayed home all weekend waiting for these documents to arrive.

Id.
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More specifically, in a letter dated March 9, 1983,
addressed to Deseret Federal and copied to Vaughn Rasmussen,
Mr. Barcal represented that "Kravco, Inc. is presently preparing leases and lease surrender forms for the square footage
discussed.

You should be receiving the lease surrender forms

in approximately five (5) business days."

R. 161. This letter

merely restates what Barcal had orally promised to Vaughn
Rasmussen on numerous occasions since August of 1982 period.
R. 158.
Crossroads provided a written lease to Vaughn Rasmussen but
after Bruce Barcal's authority to act for Deseret Federal had
terminated.

On April 13, 1983 Crossroads delivered the lease

to Vaughn Rasmussen at his home.

R. 159.

This written lease

incorporated all the essential terms of the agreement of the
parties as reached in August of 1982.

R. 9-45.

Crossroads has

previously represented in writing that the written lease document would be provided before Barcal's authority from Deseret
Federal terminated.
Mr. Barcal failed to provide the documents by March 15 when
his authority to act as agent for Deseret Federal expired.
After that time Deseret Federal refused to surrender the space
despite the undisputed fact that it had appointed Bruce Barcal
its agent for this precise purpose.

-8-

After March 15, both respondents provided Vaughn Rasmussen
with documents which represented their independent attempts to
complete the transaction.

Crossroads provided Vaughn Rasmussen

with the complete written lease document with the same terms
the parties had agreed on all along.

R. 159.

Deseret Federal,

on the other hand, attempted to bypass Crossroads by subleasing
the space directly to Vaughn Rasmussen.

R. 46-50. Crossroads

refused to consent to the sublease and Deseret Federal refused
to consent to a surrender of the space to Crossroads and,
because neither respondent cooperated, Vaughn Rasmussen never
obtained possession of the Level One space.
Vaughn Rasmussen spent a great deal of money to close the
SBA loan, to prepare construction plans for the store and for
the Deseret Federal space and to purchase inventory for the new
store.

Because of respondents' refusal to honor their agree-

ments with him, combined with Crossroads misrepresentations
about the Level Two Space, Vaughn Rasmussen has been unable to
earn the money needed to pay the expenses mentioned above and
he has been driven to financial ruin.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
None of the lower court's summary judgments in this matter
were appropriate.

In each instance the law was not properly

applied to the facts in the record.
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The genuine factual issues

were avoided by a misapplication of the statute of frauds
defense and by a misunderstanding of how the statute of limitations operates against affirmative defenses.
Respondents should not even have been allowed to assert the
statute of frauds.

Their leasing agent continuously repre-

sented to Vaughn Rasmussen that a written lease would be provided and Vaughn Rasmussen acted to his detriment in reliance
on that representation by borrowing money, purchasing inventory
and preparing to occupy the Level One space.

Utah law clearly

allows promissory estoppel to over come the statute of frauds
if the elements of the doctrine are satisfied.

Here, suffi-

cient evidence of each element was presented against respondents to raise genuine issues of fact which should be presented
to the finder of fact and which make the lower court's summary
judgment improper.
Notwithstanding that respondents should have been estopped
to assert the statute of frauds, Vaughn Rasmussen submits that
the defense should not have been applied as as matter of law in
favor of either respondent.

A genuine factual issue exists

whether there is there are sufficient memoranda of respondents'
agreements which satisfy the requirement of a writing.
Further, the oral agreements of the parties should have been
considered by a jury for equitable relief based on Vaughn
Rasmussen's partial performance.
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With respect to Crossroads' counterclaim for rent, summary
judgment was also improper.

The lower court erred in refusing

to allow Vaughn Rasmussen to assert the defense of fraud.

The

statute of limitations does not operate to bar assertion of
fraud as a defense even though it might be time barred as an
affirmative claim.

The uncontradicted facts of Vaughn

Rasmussen*s affidavit clearly raise a factual question of
whether Crossroads committed fraud in obtaining its original
lease with Vaughn Rasmussen and Vaughn Rasmussen should be
allowed to assert and prove that defense to a jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THERE
IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESPONDENTS
ARE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.
Vaughn Rasmussen had an agreement with Crossroads and
Deseret Federal.

They agreed to lease him space on the Level

One of the Mall, and the terms of that lease were fully negotiated, specified and agreed.

Through their joint agent, Bruce

Barcal, Crossroads and Deseret Federal also repeatedly promised
Vaughn Rasmussen something else - a written lease.

Respondents

never took the simple actions necessary to provide that lease
until after one or the other of respondents decided not to
honor their contract.

Then, when Vaughn Rasmussen took this
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action to enforce the lease agreement, respondents raised the
statute of frauds as a defense.

They convinced the lower court

to dismiss Vaughn Rasmussen's claim because the lease agreement
was not in writing.

It was error to allow Crossroads and

Deseret Federal to assert that defense as a matter of law after
Barcal had repeatedly promised to provide a written lease and
lease surrender form and had induced Vaughn Rasmussen to act in
reliance on those promises to his substantial detriment.
In Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956),
this Court established that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
is available to overcome the statute of frauds and enforce a
contract*

There, the plaintiff sought breach of contract dam-

ages when his lessor refused to honor their oral lease agreement.

The parties had orally agreed to the terms of the lease,

and the lessor promised to have the agreement drawn up by his
attorney.

The lessor gained summary judgment in his favor by

asserting the statute of frauds as a defense.
On appeal, this Court acknowledged the rule which governs
the present case.

It ruled that the doctrine of promissory

estoppel applies to avoid the statute of frauds if there has
been a promise to provide a written lease and if there has been
detrimental reliance on that promise.

Id. at 295 P.2d 333.

Easton the summary dismissal was affirmed only because no
showing had been made of detrimental reliance by the lessor.
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In

Here, such detrimental reliance by Vaughn Rasmussen is proved
by the record and respondents should have been barred from even
asserting the statute of frauds as a defense.
The facts in the record now before the Court also satisfy
the requirements of Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d
570 (1953).

There a purchaser sought to enforce an oral

promise to sell real property.

The seller raised the statute

of frauds as a defense, and the purchaser responded by claiming
that the seller was estopped from doing so.

This Court again

upheld the applicability of promissory estoppel to a promise to
provide a written contract:

The binding thread which runs through these cases,
distinguishing them from the general rule that a mere
promise as to future conduct will not work an estoppel, is the promise is designedly made to influence
the conduct of the promisee, tacitly encouraging the
conduct, and although the conduct of the promisee constitutes no performance of the oral contract itself,
it is something that must be done by plaintiff before
he could begin to perform, as was known to the defendants.
Id. at 260 P.2d 576.
Here Bruce Barcal did much more than tacitly encourage
Vaughn Rasmussen.

Over the course of six months he affirma-

tively and repeatedly assured Vaughn Rasmussen that it was all
right to proceed with the financing, remodeling plans and purchase of inventory because written documents were being
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prepared.

Barcal also obtained payment of $2,400 in disputed

construction charges from Vaughn Rasmussen in this manner.
During the time when Barcal was the agent of both respondents
he went so far as to specify a weekend when Federal Express
would deliver the promised documents to Vaughn Rasmussen.

When

these facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Vaughn
Rasmussen, reasonable minds could clearly find that respondents
promised to provide a written contract and that Vaughn
Rasmussen relied upon that promise to his substantial detriment.
This was the conclusion reached in Mauala v. Milford Management Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), under a similar fact situation.

There, the parties had an oral agreement

for the lease of an apartment at the Biltmore Plaza.

The

lessees viewed the apartment, delivered three checks each
representing one month rent, and also paid a security deposit
and brokerage fee.

Just as in the present case, a written

lease was drafted but never signed by the lessor.

The lessees

were given occupancy of the apartment for a short period, were
permitted to store their belongings in the apartment, and were
given keys to it.

They ordered custom made rugs and furniture

and arranged for electricity to be transferred into their
name.

The court ruled that these facts created genuine ques-

tions as to whether the lessors had misrepresented that they
would deliver a lease for the apartment and whether the lessees
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had suffered substantial injuries in reliance on this representation.

The same factual questions are presented here and they

require that the summary judgment be reversed.
In Lacy v. Wozencraft, 188 Okla. 19, 105 P.2d 781 (1940)
the lessee's showing of reliance on the promise of a written
lease was much less than that of Vaughn Rasmussen.

Neverthe-

less, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the
lower court in favor of the lessor.

There, the lessee had

occupied the premises under a written lease contract for a term
of three years.

She continued to occupy the premises after

expiration of the lease and during that times the lessor orally
agreed to lease the premises to her for another three year term
and to reduce that agreement to a writing.

The lessee's only

evidence of reliance was that she expended the sum of $1,000 in
remodeling to suit her stock of merchandise and invested
approximately $5,000 in additional merchandise.
At trial, the jury was instructed that some benefit to the
lessor had to be shown before the defense of estoppel was
available.

This was found to be error on appeal.

It was suf-

ficient to remove the oral lease agreement from the statute of
frauds that the lessee had suffered the material detriment mentioned above in expectation of the promised written lease.

On

remand, the question for the jury was whether the lessee, with
the knowledge of the lessor, had so altered her position in
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reliance on the oral agreement that to invoke the statute of
frauds would permit a fraud or other injustice to be perpetrated.
In the present case, Vaughn Rasmussen has shown significantly more detriment, has shown that respondents promised to
provide the Level One space and to put their promises in writing, and has shown that he acted in reliance on those promises.

He obtained an SBA loan, purchased inventory for the new

store, prepared construction and remodeling plans and paid
disputed construction costs.
on these facts.

R. 156-58.

His affidavit is uncontradicted
The affidavit also establishes

that respondents' leasing agent, Bruce Barcal,

represented

numerous times to Mr. Rasmussen that a written lease would be
delivered to him.

Barcal's representations are further proven

by his letter to Deseret Federal in March of 1983, stating that
the lease and surrender were presently being prepared and would
arrive before March 15, 1983.

Mr. Rasmussen incurred very

significant detriment in reliance upon Barcal's representations
and did so at a time when Barcal was the agent of both respondents.

Also, some of that detriment directly benefited Cross-

roads when Vaughn Rasmussen paid directly to Crossroads over
$2,400 in disputed costs pertaining to his Level Two lease with
Crossroads.
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The record does not contradict any of these facts, much
less overwhelm them with the weight of contrary evidence.

As

to each element of the doctrine of promissory estoppel there
is, at the very least, a factual question whether the doctrine
should apply to estop respondents from asserting the statute of
frauds.

A jury could easily find that allowing respondents to

use the defense would result in perpetration of a fraud on
Vaughn Rasmussen and for that reason, the summary judgment in
respondents' favor should be reversed so that the evidence can
be considered by a jury.
POINT II
EVEN IF RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED TO
ASSERT THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, FACTUAL ISSUES
REMAIN REGARDING THE OPERATION OF THAT
DEFENSE.
The statute of frauds is designed to prevent fraud by
requiring certain contracts to be evidenced by a writing.
Because of that design there are numerous limitations on the
statute so that oral contracts may be enforced when the facts
of the case satisfactorily show that enforcing the contract
will not perpetrate a fraud.

Appellant submits that there are

significant factual questions about whether some of those limitations apply to the agreements among Vaughn Rasmussen, Crossroads and Deseret Federal.

More particularly, respondents'

promises are sufficiently evidenced by signed writings to make
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them enforceable.

Further, Vaughn Rasmussen was at least

entitled to specific performance based on his partial performance of the oral agreements.
A.

Sufficient Memorandum - To be enforceable, Deseret

Federal's promise to surrender its space and Crossroads'
promise to lease the space to Vaughn Rasmussen had to be evidenced by writings subscribed to their agents.
§§ 25-5-1 and 3 (1953).

Utah Code Ann.

The documents presented to the lower

court satisfy this requirement.
Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), demonstrates
that the writings relied on in this case were sufficient to
entitle Vaughn Rasmussen to a trial.

There the parties had an

oral contract to sell certain land.

This contract was shown by

a combination of two documents:

a check endorsed by the seller

and an unexecuted deed showing the seller as grantor and the
buyer as grantee.

This court ruled that these two writings

could be read together because the signed writing, the check,
impliedly referred to the specific deed when it stated that the
payment was for "1/2 payment on the land as agreed - other 1/2
payment when deed delivered."

Icl. at 373.

Similar documents prove the existence of Crossroads'
lease.

Like the check in Gregerson, Crossroads' agent Bruce

Barcal signed the March 9, 1983 letter acknowledging the agreement and specifically referring to the lease and surrender
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which were being prepared.

As with the deed in Gregerson,

Crossroads also provided a complete but unexecuted lease of the
Level One space to Vaughn Rasmussen.

These documents should

have been read together to constitute a sufficient writing of
Crossroads' promise to lease the premises.
In Estate of Bonny, 600 P.2d 548 (Utah 1979), receipts of
payment satisfied the statute of frauds even without reference
to a deed.

The receipts simply described the property as

"11-acre property at Alpine."

This was adequate because parol

evidence combined with this description to leave no uncertainty
as to which property was the subject of the transaction.
In Peterson v. Hendricks, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974), letters, such as that written by Howard Swapp of Deseret Federal
in this case, were treated as sufficient memoranda of a contract.

There the parties were partners in a mining joint

venture.

The oral contract provided that the plaintiff would

work and explore the property and the defendant would, in turn,
convey to the plaintiff a one-half interest in the claims.
This agreement was shown by some letters between the parties,
including one letter signed by the defendant which stated:
I think we should go ahead as fast as possible on a
government loan, however, if Slim gets the necessary
money to reach our objective . . . .
Then if we hit and form a company. If there is
only two of us then you shall have a half interest and
myself a half interest . . . . We don't have anything
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yet going in order to form a company, and I know I
trust you and you trust me, but keep this letter as a
legal paper because this is written down in my handwriting and everyone wants something written down
spelling out their interests. Once we can really
start mining I think it will make us well off and it
might make us rich. Until then, we will have to keep
plugging away.
Id. at 322.
Here, the documents signed by Deseret Federal are substantially more certain and specific than those creating a sufficient memorandum in the preceding cases.

In particular,

Deseret Federal's senior vice-president signed a letter dated
January 13, 1983 which states:
For several months Deseret Federal Savings and Vaughn
Rasmussen have been negotiating the proposal that
Deseret Federal would vacate and Vaughn Rasmussen
would occupy approximately 950 square feet of our
space on the main plaza level.
In order to provide you with the authority necessary to manage this proposal, Deseret Federal grants
permission to your office to act as our agent under
the following conditions:
1.
The space is available only to Vaughn
Rasmussen.
2.
Deseret Federal Savings is unconditionally
released from all tenant responsibility for the subject space.
3.
Deseret Federal Savings will not pay any
fees, charges or commissions to any party for any
reason relative to the subject transaction.
4.
Deseret Federal and Vaughn Rasmussen's
additional agreements are fully executed.
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If for any reason Vaughn Rasmussen should choose to
discontinue his plans to occupy the subject space,
Deseret Federal Savings is not interested in any
further proposals. R. 175 Ex. 2.
Just as in Estate of Bonny, Mr. Swapp's reference to 950
square feet of space on the main plaza level leaves no question
about what space Deseret Federal had agreed to surrender when
it is considered in light of parol evidence.

Further, the

specific terms of Deseret Federal's agreement to surrender the
space are spelled out in itemized form in this letter.

The

letter shows that Vaughn Rasmussen had the agreement of Deseret
Federal to surrender its space on the terms provided.

Despite

the use of the word "proposal," the language of Mr. Swapp's
letter is substantially more certain than the language of the
letter in Peterson v. Hendricks, which speaks entirely in terms
of jif the joint venturers discovered ore.

Here, the only

reason Mr. Swapp used the term "proposal" is because the agreement also required the participation of Crossroads.

There is,

at the very least, a factual question raised by the letter as
to whether Deseret Federal had committed itself to Vaughn
Rasmussen.
The Utah law pertaining to writings sufficient to overcome
the statute of frauds is satisfied by the record.

This becomes

very clear when the purpose of the statute of frauds is considered.

Mr. Swapp's letter is independent proof of Vaughn
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Rasmussen's claim that he and Deseret Federal had reached an
agreement regarding the space on Level One.

Even if the single

letter of January 13, 1983, was not adequate, there is additional documentation of the agreement.

In particular, Exhibit

14 of the Deposition of Vaughn Rasmussen is a document entitled
AGREEMENT which was delivered to Vaughn Rasmussen by Howard
Swapp in March of 1983.

This five page document prepared by

Deseret Federal, shows all of the specifics of the agreement as
they were understood by Deseret Federal, including the contemplated remodeling and relocation of Deseret Federal at the
expense of Vaughn Rasmussen.

Likewise the letter of Bruce

Barcal combined with the unsigned lease provided by Crossroads
show, independent of Vaughn Rasmussen's testimony, that an
agreement existed.

For these reasons it was inappropriate for

the lower court to rule as a matter of law that there were not
sufficient memoranda of Vaughn Rasmussen*s agreements with
Crossroads and Deseret Federal.
B.

Partial Performance - Summary judgment also should not

have been granted for either respondent because there was sufficient evidence of partial performance of the oral agreement
to entitle Vaughn Rasmussen to the equitable remedy of specific
performance as prayed for in the Amended Complaint.
Ann. § 25-5-8 (1953) provides:

Utah Code

"Nothing in this chapter con-

tained shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to
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compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part
performance thereof."

Vaughn Rasmussen performed parts of his

side of the bargain by paying disputed construction costs,
obtaining the financing necessary to properly remodel and operate in the Level One space, providing Deseret Federal with
remodeling plans for its offices on 3900 South and obtaining
plans for remodeling of the Level One space itself.

These acts

are exclusively referable to the oral contract and they support
equitable enforcement of the lease.
This court recently addressed partial performance of an
oral contract in Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983),
where a ranch laborer sought to enforce an oral promise of the
ranch owner to convey certain real property.

The three ele-

ments of the doctrine were stated from a prior Utah case:
First, the oral contract and its terms
and definite; second, the acts done in
the contract must be equally clear and
third, the acts must be in reliance on

must be clear
performance of
definite; and
the contract.

Id. at 275 citing Randall v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Company, 305 P.2d at 484.
Elaborating on the second element, this Court noted that
the acts in reliance must have a direct connection to the oral
contract.

As explained by Professor Corbin:

"The performance

must be one that is in some degree evidential of the existence
of a contract and not readily explainable on any other
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ground."
(1950).

^d. at 275 citing 2 Corbin on Contracts S 425
In Martin, relief was not granted because the ranch

laborer's work at the ranch for a salary and the other acts of
partial performance could be explained equally as well by reasons other than the oral promise to convey property.
Here, however, Vaughn Rasmussen has presented evidence of
actions he took which can only be explained by the existence of
an oral contract.

He obtained an enormous Small Business

Administration loan which, on its own terms, was for the expansion of his business.

He provided Deseret Federal with archi-

tectural plans for its office remodeling at 3900 South, something he would have absolutely no reason to do were it not part
of the deal for Deseret Federal's surrender of the space.
Further, Vaughn Rasmussen paid construction costs pertaining to
his existing space.

This might be explained in other ways

except that prior to the oral contract for additional space,
Vaughn Rasmussen had flatly refused to pay the costs.

His

action in paying them was directly tied to Crossroads' promise
to lease him additional space.

Also, Vaughn Rasmussen obtained

architectural remodeling plans for the first floor space,
another action he had no reason to take were it not for the
contract that he lease the space.
In Martin this Court also looked to independent evidence of
the oral contract to support its enforcement.
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It was critical

that the ranch laborer had no admission of an oral agreement or
independent acts pointing to such an agreement.
such evidence.

Here, there is

In particular, Crossroads delivered the written

lease complete with all its terms to Vaughn Rasmussen on
April 13, 1983.

The only reason the deal could not be closed

at that time was that Deseret Federal had reneged.

Deseret

Federal's actions also independently proved the existence of
the agreement.

Howard Swapp provided the letter dated

January 13, 1983, both to Crossroads and Vaughn Rasmussen outlining the essential terms of the surrender agreement.

By the

letter Deseret Federal also took the independent action of
appointing Bruce Barcal as its agent for consummating the
transaction.

It also prepared and delivered the five-page sur-

render agreement containing all terms of Deseret Federal's
agreement with Vaughn Rasmussen.
These facts show that equitable relief is owed to Vaughn
Rasmussen because of his partial performance.

The existence of

the terms of the contract is substantially proven independent
of Vaughn Rasmussen's own actions.

The lower court's refusal

to enforce the contract, at least in equity, allows respondents
to perpetrate a fraud against Vaughn Rasmussen, in particular,
by taking his $2400 in disputed construction costs.

The

statute of frauds becomes a sword for perpetrating fraud rather
than a shield from it.

The decisions of the lower court should
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be reversed so that Vaughn Rasmussen has the opportunity to
prove more fully the existence of the oral agreement and the
fraud that was perpetrated by respondents' refusal to perform.
POINT III
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CROSSROADS* COUNTERCLAIM
WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR ASSERTION OF A DEFENSE.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations bars only claims for affirmative relief.
Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985).

Jacobsen v.

When a legal theory such as

fraud is raised as a defense, or counterclaim for offset or
recoupment, then the statute of limitations does not defeat the
defense,

^d. at 1210.

This Court's reasoning is that a

statute of limitations is designed to prevent stale claims from
being asserted, preserve evidence, and discourage inattention
to claims.

When a prayer for relief is timely and the statute

of limitations has served its purpose, then any defense that
might be raised to the claim is also timely and the statute of
limitations has no effect.

Fairness and justice demand that a

party should be granted the full opportunity to defend himself
against any attacks made upon him.
Vaughn Rasmussen did not commence an action alleging fraud
against respondents.

Rather, when Crossroads counterclaimed

against him for rent payments allegedly due, he asserted fraud

-26-

as a defense to the amounts sought.

He entered the Level Two

lease in reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentations of
Crossroads.

In Jacobsen, this Court indicated its concern that

parties have a full opportunity to defend themselves against
any timely claims asserted.

699 P.2d at 1210.

That is all

Vaughn Rasmussen seeks to do in response to the counterclaim.
The overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions follows
and supports the position taken by the Utah Supreme Court.

A

party may plead any legal theory as a defense and prove damages
so as to reduce the plaintiff's ultimate judgment.
v. Akin, 183 Kan. 207, 326 P.2d 313 (1958).
Sturgeon, 100 Kan. 604, 376 P.2d 904 (1962).

Christenson

See also Powers v.
Any affirmative

defense or claim to an offset or recoupment will not be
destroyed by a statute of limitations if the legal theory
arises "out of the transactional subject of the suit . . . and
the main action is timely."

Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v.

Apodaca, 524 P.2d 874, 879 (Wyo. 1974).

Even though the claim

would be barred if asserted as a cause for affirmative relief,
it is allowed as a defense as long as the affirmative action is
timely.

The reason for this, as simply stated in Hawkeye-

Security, is that the purpose of a statute of limitations is to
bar actions, not to suppress or deny matters of defense.
P.2d at 879.
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524

Since 1980, every state high court in the Pacific region
has held that when a legal theory is raised as a matter of pure
defense, or as a basis for recoupment or offset, it will not be
barred by a statute of limitations even though the theory would
be barred if it was asserted as an affirmative cause of
action.

See Goldberg v. Sanglier, 27 Wash. App. 179, 616 P.2d

1239 (1980) (statutes of limitations apply to actions, but not
pure defenses to actions); Aetna Finance Co. v. Pasguali, 128
Ariz. 471, 626 P.2d 1103 (1981) (a statute of limitations is
not a bar to a recoupment defense and such a defense survives
as long as plaintiff's claim can be asserted); Ackmann v.
Merchants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 645 P.2d 7 (Colo. 1982) (a
statute of limitations bars the use of a claim for affirmative
relief, but is not a bar to asserting that claim as a defense);
Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 647 P.2d 311 (1982)
(statute of limitations does not bar a counterclaim that seeks
an offset interposed defensively against a complaint arising
from the same incident); State Board of Regents v. Holt, 8 Kan.
App. 436, 659 P.2d 836 (1983) (the running of a period of limitations will not preclude a defendant from asserting an otherwise meritorious claim by way of setoff or recoupment to the
extent of the plaintiff's claim, so long as the claims
co-exist); Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 686 P.2d 79 (Idaho 1984)
(when a defense arises out of the same factual setting the
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claim is based on, the theory upon which the defense is based
will not be barred by a limitation on actions); and Dawe v.
Merchants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984)
(statute of limitations is not a bar to assert any claim as a
defense when the claim would otherwise be untimely if asserted
as a cause of action).
The lower court based its decision in favor of Crossroads
on its opinion that the defense of fraud asserted by
Mr. Rasmussen "will not lie."

R. 244.

It appears that the

court did not consider the fraud defense to have been timely
raised.

Jacobsen and the other case law cited above demon-

strates that this is simply not the case.
If the claim or counterclaim to which the defense is
asserted is timely, then the evidence will be preserved, the
claim will receive appropriate and timely attention and justice
will be best served because the complete matter will be disposed of in a timely fashion.

Vaughn Rasmussen should not be

penalized because, for whatever reason, he chose not to sue
Crossroads for fraud in connection with the Level Two lease.
His decision does not eliminate the uncontradicted facts in his
affidavit that Crossroads blatantly misrepresented to him the
location of the planned walkway and did so to induce him to
enter the Level Two lease. The summary judgment on Crossroads'
counterclaim should be reversed so that Mr. Rasmussen can present evidence of fraud as a defense to the counterclaim.
-29-

CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that the lower court's treatment of this
case was improper for several reasons.

Because of their

promise to provide a written contract, respondents are estopped
to assert the statute of frauds.

Furthermore, the merits of

that defense were not established as a matter of law because of
the written evidence of the agreements and because of Vaughn
Rasmussen's partial performance.

Finally, it was wholly

improper to deny Vaughn Rasmussen the opportunity to assert
fraud as a defense.

For these reasons appellant respectfully

submits that the rulings of the District Court should be
reversed in all respects.
DATED this P±

day of September, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Ree6/L. Mrfrt ineau
^ c E , Madsen
Stephen J. Hill
John R. Lund
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

25-1-1!

Fraud

(1) To a partner, whether with or without a
promise by him to pay partnership debts; or,
(2) To a person not a partner without fair consideration to the partnership, as distinguished from
consideration to the individual partners.
if$3

J985-19W

(3) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligation; or,

(4) Make any order which the circumstances of
the case may require.
i*»

Chapter 2. Sale of Merchandise in Bulk

25-1-11. Trust for grantor void.

All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or
things in action made in trust for the use of the
person making the same shall be void as against the
existing or subsequent creditors of such person.
vm

25-2-1 to 25-2-5. Repealed.

25-1-12. "Creditors,* "purchasers" Includes Mrs.
Every conveyance, charge, instrument or proceeding declared to be void by the provisions of this
chapter as against creditors and purchasers shall be
equally void as against the heirs, successors,
personal representatives or assigns of such creditors
or purchasers.
ifS3

Chapter 4. Marketing Wool

25*1-13. Bona M e purchasers sot affected.
The provisions of this chapter shall not be
construed to affect or impair the title of a purchaser
for a valuable consideration, unless it appears that
such purchaser had previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor, or of the fraud
rendering void the title of such grantor.
its?
25-1-14. Saks without change of possession.
Every sale made by a seller of goods or chattels
in his possession or under his control, and every assignment of goods and chattels, unless the same is
accompanied by a delivery within a reasonable time,
and is followed by an actual and continued change
of the possession of the things sold or assigned,
shall be conclusive evidence of fraud as against the
creditors of the seller or assignor, or subsequent purchasers in good faith. The word 'creditors' as
used in this section shall be construed to include all
persons who shall be creditors of the seller or
assignor at any time while such goods and chattels
shall remain in his possession or under his control.
19S3

25-1-15. Sights of creditors with matured dalms.
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as
to a creditor, such creditor, when his claim has
matured, may, as against any person, except a
purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge
of the fraud at the time of the purchase or one who
has derived title immediately or mediately from such
a purchaser:
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim;
or,

(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy
execution upon, the property conveyed.
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent
lias given less than a fair consideration for the conveyance or obligation may retain the property or
obligation as security for repayment.
its)
25-1-16. Rights of creditors with dalms aot
matured.
Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred
is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim has not
matured, he may proceed in a court of competent
jurisdiction against any person against whom he
could have proceeded, had his claim matured, and
the court may:
(1) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his
property;
(2) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the
property;
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Chapter 3. Leases and Sales of Livestock
25-5-1 to 25-5-4. Repealed.

ws

25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed.

ms

Chapter 5. Statute of Frauds
25-5-1. Estate or interest la real property.
254-2. WUs aad smoked trusts excepted.
25-5-3. Leasts aad coatrocti for interest la toads.
25-5-4. Certata agronaeaU void antes* writtea aad taostri25-5-5. Sepreseatatioa at to credit of third aersoa.
25-5-4. Promise to aaswer for obligattoa of aaother •
When aot required to he la writiag.
25*5-7. Coatractf by telegraph deeaed writtea.
25-5-1. Right to apedftc nerioraaact aot affected.
25-5-9. Ageat stay rfft for prtadptJ.
25-5-1. Estate or Interest hi real property.

No estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any
trust or power over or concerning real property or
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise
than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized
by writing.
ltss
25-5-2. Wills and Implied tnuU excepted.
The next preceding section [25-5-1] shall not be
construed to affect the power of a testator in the disposition of his real estate by last will and testament; nor to prevent any trust from arising or being
extinguished by implication or operation of law. m s
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for Interest In lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any
interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is
to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
&&
25-5-4. Certain agreements void anleas written and
subscribed.
In the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the
party to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be
performed within one year from the making
thereof.
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default
or miscarriage of another.
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking
made upon consideration of marriage, except
mutual promises to marry.
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or
administrator to answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or intestate

For ANNOTATIONS, coaoah the bleu UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS.
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Fraud

25-5-9

out of his own estate.
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an
agent or broker to purchase or scU real estate for
compensation.
tm
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person.
To charge a person upon a representation as to
the credit of a third person, such representation, or
some memorandum thereof, must be in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith,
tfss
25-54. Promise to answer for obligation of another
• When not required to be in writing.
A promise to answer for the obligation of
another in any of the following cases is deemed an
original obligation of the promisor and need not be
in writing:
(1) Where the promise is made by one who has
received'property of another upon an undertaking
to apply it pursuant to such promise, or by one who
has received a discharge from an obligation in
whole or in part in consideration of such promise.
(2) Where the creditor parts with value or eniers
into an obligation in consideration of the obligation
in respect to which the promise is made in terms or
under circumstances such as to render the party
making the promise the principal debtor and the
person in whose behalf it is made his surety.
(3) Where the promise, being for an antecedent
obligation of another, is made upon the consideration that the party receiving it cancel the antecedent
obligation, accepting the new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the consideration that the
party receiving it releases the property of another
from a levy or his person from imprisonment under
an execution on a judgment obtained upon the antecedent obligation; or upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either
party to the antecedent obligation or from another
person.
(4) Where a factor undertakes for a commission
to sell merchandise and to guarantee the sale.
(5) When the holder of an instrument for the
payment of money upon which a third person is or
may become liable to him transfers it in payment of
* precedent debt of his own, or for a new consideration, and in connection with such transfer enters
into a promise respecting such instrument.
m
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Contracts made by telegraph shall be deemed to
be contracts in writing, and all communications tent
by telegraph and signed by the person sending the
tame, or by his authority, shall be deemed to be
Communications in writing.
ifS3
i5-5-g. Right to specific performance not affected.
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be
Construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel
the specific performance of agreemenu in case of
Part performance thereof.
itss
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal.
Every instrument required by the provisions of
this chapter to be subscribed by any party may be
subscribed by the lawful agent of such party.
tm
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tetfti ymm
C. Keith Rooker, Esq. (A2796)
Robert S. Clark, Esq. (A4015)
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR
Attorneys for Defendant
185 South State Street
Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF DISMISSAL AS TO DESERET
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION

VAUGHN RASMUSSEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Civil No.

C83-6988S

Defendant.
A h e a r i n g was c o n d u c t e d on November 1 9 , 1 9 8 4 , on t h e
Motion of Defendant D e s e r e t F e d e r a l Savings and Loan A s s o c i a t i o n
("Deseret

Federal")

represented

for

by S t e p h e n

C h r i s t e n s e n and M a r t i n e a u .
Robert

S.

Clark

of

Summary J u d g m e n t .
J.

Hill

and Rex E. Madsen of

Deseret

Rooker,

Plaintiff

was
Snov/,

F e d e r a l was r e p r e s e n t e d

Larsen,

Kimball

reviewing the motion and t h e p l e a d i n g s and f i l e

& Parr.
in t h i s

by

After
matter,

and a f t e r h e a r i n g the argument of counsel t h e r e o n , and good cause
appearing

therefor,
Addendum A-3

IT IS HEREBY OPDERED:
1.

Defendant Deseret Federal!s Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted.
2.

All claims for relief and causes of action

asserted against Deseret Federal Savings and Loan Association are
dismissed with prejudice.

At^^ii^bzi.

Honorable James S.^Sawaya
D i s t r i c t Judge
A T T r-r>-~
Approved as to form:

By

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By:

D

Itephen J . HilJL/,
HilJU Esq.
Stephen
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f

ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR

By:
Robert S. Clark, Esq*
Attorneys for Defendant
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-2-

^ - / c7,

Robert M. Anderson, 0108
Richard D. Parry, 4112
BERMAN & ANDERSON
50 South Main street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: 328-2200
Attorneys for Defendants
The Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States and Okland-Foulger
Company, d/b/a Crossroads Plaza Associates
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

VAUGHN RASMUSSEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, a Utah
corporation, and THE EQUITABLE
LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE
UNITED STATES, a New York
corporation, and OKLANDFOULGER COMPANY, a Maryland
joint venture, d/b/a CROSSROADS
PLAZA ASSOCIATES,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF DISMISSAL AS TO THE
EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY OF THE UNITED
STATES AND OKLAND-FOULGER
COMPANY d/b/a CROSSROADS
PLAZA ASSOCIATES
Civil No. C83-6988
Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendants.

A hearing was conducted on January 7, 1985, on the
Motion of Defendants The Equitable Life Assurance Society of
the United states and Okland-Foulger Company, d/b/a Crossroads
Plaza Associates for Summary Judgment.

Plaintiff was

represented by Stephen J. Hill of Snow, Christensen and
Martineau, Crossroads Plaza Associates was represented by
Addendum A-5

i

Richard D. Parry of Berman & Anderson.

After reviewing the

motion and the pleadings on file in this matter, and after
hearing the arguments of counsel thereon, and good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Defendants', The Equitable Life Assurance Society

of the United States and Okland-Foulger Company, d/b/a
Crossroads Plaza Associates, Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted.
2.

All claims for relief and causes of action

against defendants The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States and Okland-Foulger Company, d/b/a Crossroads
Plaza Associates are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

day of January, 1985.-

^-r-i^~7'
Hcpnorable James S . Sa>/a:
ay a
D i s t r i c t Judge

Approved as to form:
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
By

Stephen J. Hill, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BERMAN & ANDERSON
By:

/ U v Lf* A /"! /
Richard D. Parr'y

-?^"

Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the
foregoing Summary Judgment and Order of Dismissal were mailed,
postage prepaid, this ^pl^

day of January, 1985, to:

Reed L. Martineau, Esq.
Rex E. Madsen, Esq.
Stephen J. Hill, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Plaintiff

C. Keith Rooker, Esq.
Robert S. Clark, Esq.
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Deseret Federal Savings & Loan
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Robert M. Anderson, 0108
Richard D. Parry, 4112
BERMAN & ANDERSON
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: 328-2200
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Attorneys for Defendants
P* ~ 19 7 ^O '
The Equitable Life Assurance Society
S^'ZrL c/Tc - 2
of the United States and Okland-Foulger
Company, d/b/a Crossroads Plaza Associates
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

VAUGHN RASMUSSBN.
Plaintiff.
vs.
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al..
Defendants.

i
•
)
>
|
])
]
l
;I

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIM OF THE EQUITABLE LIFE
ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OKLANDFOULGER COMPANY, d/b/a
CROSSROADS PLAZA ASSOCIATES
Civil No. C83-6988
Judge James S. Sawaya

A hearing was conducted on May 6, 1985. on the Motion of
The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States and
Okland-Foulger Company, d/b/a Crossroad Plaza Associates for
summary judgment on their Counterclaim.

Plaintiff Vaughn

Rasmussen was represented by Rey E. Madsen and John R. Lund of
Snow, Christensen and Martineau, Crossroads Plaza Associates were
represented by Richard D. Parry of Berman & Anderson.

After

reviewing the motion and the pleadings on file in this matter, and
after hearing the arguments of counsel thereon, and good cause
appearing therefor,
,ADdendum A-9
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Motion of the Equitable Life Assurance Society of

the United States and Okland-Foulger Company, d/b/a Crossroad Plaza
Associates for summary judgment on their Counterclaim is granted.
2.

Judgment is rendered against Vaughn Rasmussen and in

favor of Crossroad Plaza Associates in the amount of Seventeen
Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-Eight Dollars and Eighty-Four Cents
($17,698.84) which represents the full amount of payments due to
Crossroads Plaza Associates as of the date of this judgment after
the subtraction of $399.72 in tenant improvements disputed by
Vaughn Rasmussen, together with interest thereon from the date of
judgment at the rate of 10% per annum.
DATED this 20

day of May, 1985.

Ron^fiible James S. Sawaya
Di'Btrict Judge
ATTEST
H. DIXON H I N D L E Y
Cler*

Approved as to form:
By

N>

• w^n h

Deputy Clerk

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
By
Stephen J. Hill
Attorneys for Vaughn Rasmussen
BERMAN & ANDERSON

By y ^

>^

S'

^y^
Richard D. Parry
Attorneys for The Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States and Okland-Foulger
Company, d/b/a Crossroads Plaza Associates
r

<£S{
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 1985, a
true and correct copy of foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
COUNTERCLAIM OF THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE
UNITED STATES AND OKLAND FOULGER COMPANY, d/b/a CROSSROADS PLAZA
ASSOCIATES was hand delivered to the following:
Reed L. Martineau, Esq.
Rex E. Madsen. Esq.
Stephen J. Hill, Esq.
SNOW. CHR1STENSEN & MARTINEAU
Ten Exchange Place. Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City. Utah 84110
Attorneys for Plaintiff

a

/

/

'•

t L*^z. UL**t /
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'' i>\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of September, 1985,
four true and correct copies of Brief of Appellant were hand
delivered to each of the foregoing:
Robert S. Clark
Larsen, Kimball, Parr & Crockett
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
Deseret Federal
Robert M. Anderson
Richard D. Parry
Berman & Anderson
50 South Main, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
The Equitable Life Assurance
Society and Okland-Foulger Company
DATED this «-J

day of September, 1985.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Pbhn R. fcund
'Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Appellant

